Password-based user authentication schemes are widely adopted to authenticate the legitimacy of a remote user. This article will propose a new password-based user authentication scheme with key agreement using smart cards.
Introduction
In 1981, Lamport [2] proposed a remote password authentication scheme by using smart cards to authenticate the legitimacy of remote users over an insecure channel. Since then, several authentication schemes [1, 3, 8] have been proposed to enhance the efficiency and security of a remote password authentication scheme. In these proposed schemes, a password table is required for verifying the legitimacy of a login user. These schemes must keep the password table secret, carefully maintain the password table, and prevent it from being tampered and compromised. When the number of legal users is extremely large, the task of
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managing the password table will become increasingly complicated. In 2000, Hwang and Li [1] proposed a new remote user authentication scheme using smart cards without maintaining a password table. Their scheme not only requires no password table but also withstands the replay attack. Later, Sun [6] proposed a new remote user authentication scheme to improve the efficiency of Hwang and Li's scheme [1] . However, the user must memorize an un-human lengthy password instead of a human memorized password, since it is determined by the system. Recently, Wu and Chieu [7] proposed a user friendly remote authentication scheme to achieve user friendliness that users can freely choose and change their human memorized passwords. Yang and Wang [9] , however, demonstrate that Wu and Chieu's scheme [7] is vulnerable to two attacks, the password guessing attack and the forgery attack.
In addition to Yang and Wang's proposed attacks [9] , Wu and Chieu's scheme [7] only achieves unilateral authentication that only the server can authenticate the legitimacy of the remote user. The remote user cannot authenticate the legitimacy of the authentication server. Moreover, Wu and Chieu's scheme does not provide key agreement mechanism which allows the user and server to establish a shared secret session key for securing further communications. It is costly to perform an addition key exchange (or key agreement) protocol to establish such a key. In this paper, we will propose a user friendly remote mutual authentication scheme with key agreement using smart cards. The proposed scheme not only withstands Yang and Wang's proposed attacks [9] and eliminates above weaknesses, but also achieves the user friendliness, the mutual authentication, and the key agreement. The mutual authentication is to allow both authentication server and remote user to verify the legitimacy of the other one.
In Section 2, we will briefly review Wu and Chieu's scheme [7] and discuss its weaknesses. In Section 3, we will propose a remote mutual authentication scheme with key agreement. In Section 4, we will discuss the security analysis and the performance evaluations of the proposed scheme. Finally, we give conclusions in Section 5.
Wu and Chieu's User Authentication Scheme and Its
Weaknesses
In this section, we briefly review Wu and Chieu's user authentication scheme [7] , which consists of three phases: the registration, the login, and the authentication. In the registration phase, each registering user chooses his identifier and password at will and then sends { , } to an authentication server AS for registration. At completion of the registration phase, the user will obtain a smart card containing some secret registering information from the server AS. In the login phase, the user can use his smart card and the chosen password to create a valid login message to the authentication server AS for gaining the access rights. In the authentication phase, the server AS is able to determine whether the user is authorized to get the access rights by checking the validity of 's login message. Detailed descriptions of these phases are given in the following. First of all, we suppose p and g are public system parameters, where p is a large prime and g is a primitive element in GF(p). The symbol h denotes a collision-resistant secure one-way hash function [4] [5] , wherein the output is regarded as the hashed value of the concatenation of messages and . 
, where x is the secret key of the authentication server AS.
Step 2. Use and 's password to compute as
Step 3. Submit the smart card storing the information to the user .
Wu and Chieu claimed that the server AS does not need to create and maintain a password table for user authentication [7] .
Login Phase -When the registered user wants to login the system for gaining the access rights, he attaches his smart card to the card reader and enters in his identifier and password . The smart card owned by will perform the following steps to create and submit a valid login message to the server AS:
Step 1. Use stored in 's smart card and the password keyed in by to compute and as
) (
where T is the current date and time and the symbol " ⊕ " is the bit-wise exclusive-or operation for two bit-string.
Step 2. Send the login message to the server AS. Step 3. Compute as
and compare whether the computed is the same as the received .
If they are identical, the server AS accepts this login request; Otherwise, AS rejects this login request.
In 2004, Yang and Wang [9] pointed out that Wu and Chieu's scheme [7] is vulnerable to the password guessing attack and the forgery attack as follows. 
In addition to Yang and Wang's proposed attacks [9] , Wu and Chieu's scheme [7] only provides unilateral authentication, but mutual authentication.
That is, only the server can authenticate the identification of a remote user identity, while the user cannot authenticate the identification of the server AS. It can be seen that the adversary might masquerade as the authentication server to cheat the remote user. The remote user has no idea to ensure the legitimacy of the authentication server. Moreover, when a legal user successfully passes the authentication, he will gain the rights to access some information or service maintained by the server. The user will subsequently communicate with the server for obtaining information or service from the server. For securing the communication between them, they must perform an addition key exchange (or key agreement) protocol with the server to establish a common secret session key.
It is costly to perform the protocol for them.
The Proposed Scheme
In the following, we will propose a user friendly remote mutual authentication scheme with key agreement using smart cards, which withstands Yang and Wang's proposed attacks [9] and eliminates the pointed out weaknesses.
The proposed scheme also consists three phases as those of Wu and Chieu's scheme [7] . Descriptions of these phases are given below. First of all, we suppose p and g are public system parameters, where p is a large prime and g is a primitive element in GF(p). The symbol h denotes a collision-resistant secure one-way hash function [4] [5] , wherein the output is regarded as the hashed value of the concatenation of messages and . 
where x is the secret key owned and maintained only by the authentication server AS. Then, AS issues a smart card containing the information to . 
) , (
where T is the current date and time of the card reader. Then, the smart card sends the login message to the server AS. 
with AS's secret key x and 's identifier , and
Step 4. Check if . If it holds, then AS is convinced that is a legal user associated with the identifier and accepts 's login request. 
where T ′ ′ is the current time stamp, and sends 
By the same way, the AS can also compute the shared secret session key K by Eq. (12). Note that the proposed scheme can achieve the user friendliness that users can freely choose and change their human memorized passwords. If a legal user wants to change his password , he can attach his smart card to a card reader and key in old password together with new password .
The smart card will perform the login and the authentication phases to check the authenticity of the old password . If the authenticity of is verified, then the smart card will replace with , where
. After that, the user can use the new password to login the system.
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Security Analysis and Performance Evaluations
In this section, we will analyze the security of the proposed scheme and evaluate its performance. Detailed descriptions of security analysis and performance evaluations are given below.
Security Analysis
The security analysis of the proposed scheme is similar to that of Wu and Chieu's scheme [7] , the reader is encouraged to refer to [7] . From the security analysis of [7] , it can be also seen that the proposed scheme is secure against the replay attacks, the modification attacks, and the compromising attacks. Here, we only discuss the off-line password guessing, the on-line password guessing, the server impersonation, and the session key compromising attacks on the proposed scheme. 
Analysis
Analysis of the server impersonation attack: Consider the server impersonation attack that the adversary attempts to masquerade as the server to cheat the remote user. If such an attack can be successfully plotted, it implies that the proposed scheme cannot achieve the mutual authentication. In the proposed From above discussions, the proposed scheme is secure against the off-line password guessing, the on-line password guessing, the server impersonation, and the session key compromising attacks. The security comparison of of the proposed scheme and Wu and Chieu's scheme [7] is given in Table 1 .
compared to the other computing time, it is ignored here. Table 2 illustrates the efficiency comparison of the proposed scheme and Wu and Chieu's scheme [7] in terms of the computational complexities, the communication costs, and the required storage. From Table 2 , we can see that the proposed scheme is more efficient than Wu and Chieu's scheme [7] in the registration and the login phases in terms of the computational complexities. The proposed scheme requires only one more exponentiation computation than Wu and Chieu's scheme [7] . Moreover, the proposed scheme is also more efficient than Wu and Chieu's scheme [7] in terms of communication costs and the required storage. Therefore, the performance of the proposed scheme outperforms that of Wu and Chieu's scheme [7] . Table 2 . Comparison of the proposed scheme and Wu and Chieu's scheme key agreement using smart cards. The proposed scheme not only achieves the user authentication without maintaining a password table, but also achieves the user friendliness, the mutual authentication, and the key agreement. It eliminates the security leaks and weaknesses inherent in Wu and Chieu's scheme [7] . The performance of the proposed scheme is more efficient than that of Wu and
Chieu's scheme in terms of the computational complexities, the communication costs, and the required storage.
